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Abstract
This paper analyzes how electoral incentives shape fiscal policy, focusing on the introduc-
tion of mayoral term limits in Portugal. Applying a difference-in-differences approach,
we find evidence that when a municipality has a term-limited mayor, it experiences a fall
in revenues and expenditures. The effect seems to be driven by lower effort of lame-duck
mayors, relative to reelection-eligible ones, to implement new investments and to obtain
conditional grants from the central government, especially in election years. Although
lame ducks are less opportunistic in general, the results suggest that opportunism may
not decrease in municipalities whose term-limited mayors resign before the end of their
terms and are replaced by their (eligible) vice-mayors.
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1. Introduction
The introduction of term limits for public officials is an unusual event in electoral
system change that provides a unique testing ground to study the incentive effects of elec-
tions on economic policy choices. By reducing rents from holding office, term limits may
increase politicians’ incentives to act on behalf of general welfare and not pander to pub-
lic opinion (Smart and Sturm, 2013). However, they may also reduce reputation-building
efforts and the accumulation of experience by incumbent politicians, while diminishing
the power of elections to scrutinize competent policymakers (Alt et al., 2011; Besley and
Case, 1995; Bonfiglioli and Gancia, 2013). The controversy regarding the impacts of term
limits and the focus of most of the existing analyses on the US reality render special
importance to the study of how term limits affect electoral incentives and fiscal policy
choices in other countries with different institutional, economic and social settings.
This paper studies the effects of electoral incentives on the management of local fiscal
policy, focusing on the recent introduction of term limits at the municipal level in Portugal.
According to a law approved in 2005, mayors cannot serve for more than three consecutive
terms in the same municipality. Despite the fact that 52% of the Portuguese mayors
were prevented from running for reelection when the limit became binding in the 2013
local elections, the impact of this institutional change in politicians’ behavior is clearly
under-researched. The scarcity of legislative changes such as these and the fact that, in
the published literature for countries other than the US, the impact of term limits on
local politicians’ incentives have only been studied for Brazil and Italy renders additional
relevance to the analysis of the Portuguese case.
The empirical analysis applies a difference-in-differences (DD) framework to study the
effects of the imposition of term limits (through a law approved in the national parliament)
on fiscal policy choices at the local level. This framework, in which the treatment group
is comprised of municipalities with term-limited (lame-duck) mayors, while those with
reelection-eligible mayors are in the control group, is used to check whether differences
in politicians’ electoral incentives influence fiscal policy choices or not. Concretely, we
check if term-limited mayors manage municipal finances differently from reelection-eligible
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mayors. Then, extended DD models are used to test the existence of political budget cycles
and the hypotheses that term-limited mayors are less opportunistic than reelection-eligible
mayors are, and that all lame ducks are not equally opportunistic. We use a comprehensive
dataset comprising all 308 Portuguese municipalities over four 4-year terms (from 1998
to 2013). The dataset includes the full public accounts of municipalities and detailed
information describing mayors and socio-economic and demographic characteristics of
municipalities.
Although our empirical analysis focuses on the Portuguese experience with mayoral
term limits, our results are relevant for other countries as well. Term limits change the
incentives faced by incumbent mayors which, according to our results, influence their fiscal
policy decisions. Although the magnitude of the effects may differ, depending on local
circumstances, legislators of other countries contemplating the possibility of introducing
binding term limits to local office-holders can extract useful information from our study.
Namely, they learn that, while reducing the incentives to implement opportunistic fiscal
policies, term limits also induce lower effort by term-limited mayors, especially if they
do not run for other positions or leave office prior to the end of the term in favor of
their deputy-mayors. The external validity of our study also derives from the fact that
we are able to analyze the fiscal policy decisions of various types of term-limited mayors
(resigning mayors, candidates to other offices, true lame ducks). We believe that our
results may help policymakers of other countries design term-limit laws which lead to
greater improvements in fiscal policy management than in the Portuguese case.
2. Literature review
A fundamental question in political economy is whether the possibility of reelection
affects policy choices. By making officials accountable, elections induce them to act in the
public interest, reducing moral-hazard (Barro, 1973). If incumbents care about reelection
prospects, they are keen to develop a reputation that enhances their reelection chances.
Additionally, elections allow the electorate to remove from office politicians who do not
behave according to the general interest (Ferejohn, 1986), therefore creating an adverse-
3
selection correction effect. However, the desire to win elections may lead politicians to
adopt populist measures to win votes generating an electoral cycle in economic policy.1
Furthermore, lobbyist capture may increase with additional terms in office (Ehrenhalt,
1991; Fund, 1990).
The distortionary influence of the vote motive on public policy gave rise to an exten-
sive literature on the so called political budget cycle (PBC).2 Based on the hypothesis
that the incumbent’s level of competency is private information, Rogoff and Sibert (1988)
and Rogoff (1990) developed rational expectations models in which opportunistic incum-
bents use fiscal policy to signal their competency prior to elections. This is done by
increasing seignorage tax in order to signal that less revenue is needed to provide a given
level of government services (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988),3 or by increasing government con-
sumption spending and/or reducing taxes that are immediately visible by the electorate,
while reducing government investment (Rogoff, 1990). In these models, more competent
politicians distort public policy by more than less competent ones to separate themselves,
and increase their chances of re-election. More recently, political budget cycles models
of career concerns where developed (Shi and Svensson, 2006; Alt and Lassen, 2006), in
which all politicians, regardless of their competency levels, have an incentive to increase
the supply of public goods prior to elections to boost their re-election prospects. The
strength of the incentives depend on the rents that can be extracted while in office, and
on fiscal policy transparency. Regardless of the theoretical approach followed, binding
term limits reduce the incentive to generate PBCs.
The rise in public debt levels and the sovereign debt crisis faced by several countries
increased interest in studying the effects of constitutional design on public finance. Bon-
figlioli and Gancia (2013) present a rational model of electoral accountability to study the
determinants of political myopia. Despite the political myopia resulting from reelection
concerns, they find that ruling out the possibility of reelection reduces politicians’ effort
and removes the possibility of retaining the best performing officials. They conclude that
holding elections is better than having a one-term limit, unless rents from office are very
large and differences in ability are low. Similarly, Smart and Sturm (2013) developed a
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political agency model to show that, despite the accountability effect of elections, term
limits can be in the interest of the electorate. By reducing the value of office, term limits
induce incumbents to implement policies that are closer to voters’ preferences, enabling
them to reelect higher quality agents.
Empirical studies analyzing the effects of term limits are relatively scarce, and most
of them focus on American states. For US state governors, most studies found systematic
differences in state fiscal policies depending on whether governors are subject to a binding
term limitation or allowed to stand for reelection. Taxes and expenditures tend to be
higher, while income growth tends to be lower, in states imposing term limits, because
lame ducks care less about building political reputation (Alt et al., 2011; Besley and
Case, 1995, 2003). Furthermore, accountability and competence effects of elections on
governors’ performance are different: Economic growth is higher and taxes, spending and
borrowing costs are lower under reelection-eligible incumbents than under lame ducks
(accountability effect), and under reelected incumbents than under first-term incumbents
(competence effect), all else equal. The two effects are of similar magnitude, and in the
case of two-term limits, they can cancel each other out (Alt et al., 2011).4
Also for the US states, several studies investigated whether term limits reduce electoral
manipulations of fiscal variables and pork-barrel policies. For general expenditure, guber-
natorial term limits do not appear to significantly affect the magnitude of the political
business cycles (Rose, 2006). This finding suggests that governors care for their reputa-
tion, probably because they intend to run for higher offices or want to help their party’s
candidate. However, for environmental policy, when the electorate is pro-environment,
lame ducks seem to spend less on the environment than reelection-eligible incumbents
(List and Sturm, 2006). Finally, there is evidence that legislators bring less pork pro-
vision (fiscal transfers) to their districts if they cannot run for another term (Aidt and
Shvets, 2012; Bernhardt et al., 2004).
Studies focusing on term limits at the local government level are scarce. To the best
of our knowledge, only the Brazilian, Italian and Portuguese cases have been studied.
For Brazilian municipalities, the empirical evidence suggests that mayors that can run for
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another term are less corrupt than those that cannot (Ferraz and Finan, 2011), but adopt
more opportunistic policies (Klein and Sakurai, 2015). Additionally, the co-existance of
term limits and of weak attachment of Brazilian mayors to parties, compromises account-
ability and influences the incentives and careers of politicians, increasing political volatil-
ity and hindering the legitimacy of parties and elections (Klasnja and Titiunik, 2017). In
Italian municipalities, term-limited mayors set lower property tax rates than reelection-
eligible incumbents during the term, but a higher rate before the elections (Padovano and
Petrarca, 2014). For Portugal, preliminary research suggests that mayors who cannot
stand for another term in office choose lower current expenditures and property tax rates
relative to reelection-eligible incumbents (Lopes da Fonseca, 2016).5
In sum, the introduction of term limits provides a unique opportunity to analyze the
effects of electoral incentives on fiscal policy choices. We believe that our research on
the Portuguese case can move forward the literature on the topic in several ways. First,
the effects of term limits have been studied mainly at the state level for the US. Other
countries’ experiences with term limits, especially at the local/municipal level, are under-
researched and may provide useful insights for countries with similar institutional systems.
While in the US, states decide on the adoption of term limits, and term-limit laws vary
from state to state, in Portugal the institutional reform was approved by the national
parliament (exogenously imposed), and the same law applies to all local governments,
rendering the estimation of the term-limit treatment effect less problematic. Second,
unlike most previous research, we take into account the effects of incumbents’ experience
on fiscal policy choices. Third, we have built an extensive dataset on local public finances
that goes beyond major aggregates, and includes the socio-economic characteristics of
municipalities, and detailed information on mayors, therefore allowing for a thorough
study of the effects of term limits on municipal fiscal variables. Finally, we are able to
disentangle various types of term-limited mayors (resigning mayors, candidates to other
offices, true lame ducks) which provides an opportunity to analyze how differences in
electoral incentives may lead to heterogeneous local fiscal policy management among
term-limited mayors in election years.
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3. Institutional setting and testable hypotheses
This section starts by describing the institutional setting in which Portuguese munic-
ipalities operate. Then, building on the literature surveyed in section 2, and taking the
specific incentives of Portuguese mayors into account, testable hypotheses regarding the
effects of binding term limits on the management of municipal finances are derived.
3.1. Institutional setting
Portugal is a unitary state,6 with 308 municipalities (278 of which are in the main-
land), all subject to the same legal and institutional framework. Municipalities have a
deliberative branch (the Municipal Assembly) and an executive branch (the Town Coun-
cil). More than half of the Municipal Assembly’s members are elected directly by voters,
and the remaining members are the presidents of the councils of the parishes that belong
to the municipality (who are also elected directly by voters). The mayor is the president
of the Town Council and has a prominent role in the executive branch. All members of
the Town Council are elected directly by voters, who vote on party or independent closed
lists. The first candidate of the list receiving most votes becomes the mayor. Elections
for the Municipal Assembly and the Town Council were always held on the same day, and
took place in December until 2001, and subsequently in October. The first elections after
the reestablishment of democracy in 1974 were held in December 1976. Terms were three
years long until 1985, when they were extended to four years.
Given the greater proximity between politicians and voters at the local level, the
candidates frequently matter more than their parties for how people vote. In fact, several
mayors who had problems with their initial supporting parties, ran in the lists of different
parties (or as independent) in the subsequent elections, and managed to win again.7
Additionally, Portuguese mayors enjoy considerable personal incumbency advantage,8 as
Aidt, Veiga, and Veiga (2011) show that the winning margin of the mayor’s party over
the main opposition party is about 8 percentage points higher when the mayor runs
for reelection than when her party has a new candidate. This result was confirmed by
Lopes da Fonseca (2017), who concluded that returns to incumbency in Portuguese local
elections are positive and statistically significant, and that the incumbency advantage
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is personal rather than partisan. Thus, the parties’ national directions seldom confront
well-established mayors.9
Until the 2013 local elections, there were no limits on the number of consecutive terms
a mayor could serve. Although article n. 118 of the Portuguese Constitution establishes
the principle of the renewal of elected executives, the interpretation was that regular
elections were enough to guarantee it, and previous proposals for the imposition of term
limits were rejected with the argument that they violated the constitutional rights of
those who could not stand for reelection. But, in practice, most mayors were reelected,
and many spent long periods in power.10 Very long tenures of mayors generated the feeling
that regular elections were not enough to guarantee turnover, and the 2004 constitutional
revision established the possibility of introducing term limits to elected executive officials.
Then, after March 2005, proposals for a law introducing term limits were presented by
the government and by the main opposition parties. Following some negotiation, Law n.
46/2005 was approved in July 2005, imposing a three-term limit to mayors and parish
presidents.11
The law came into effect in January 2006, but a transitory provision allowed all mayors
to run for reelection in 2009. Thus, the law only became binding in the 2013 elections,
forbidding 160 mayors from running for reelection in the same municipality. Of these,
82 belonged to the center-right Social Democratic Party (PPD-PSD) or a coalition of
PPD-PSD with the Popular Party, 59 to the Socialist Party, 13 to the Communist Party,
one to the Left Block, and five were independent.12 Of the 148 reelection-eligible mayors,
87 were in their first term, and 61 were in the second.
Although many term-limited mayors remained in office until the end of their terms
and did not run for further offices in 2013 (the 61 mayors henceforth referred to as true
lame ducks), more than half behaved differently. Twenty-six mayors resigned before the
end of their terms, being replaced by their vice-mayors, most of whom ran for mayor in
the next elections.13 Seventy-five mayors, including seven of the resigning mayors, ran for
president of the Municipal Assembly. Finally, ten term-limited mayors ran for mayor in
a different municipality, six of whom were elected.
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Given that 52% of all mayors could not run for reelection in 2013, this legislative re-
form led to a significant turnover of mayors, and may have had a strong impact on local
fiscal policy choices. Mayors are the key figures of the Town Councils. They decide to
which councilors they delegate executive competencies, and have managerial autonomy
in matters such as human resource management, project approval, and the awarding of
construction contracts. Usually, only councilors of the mayor’s party have delegated com-
petencies. Although the Municipal Assembly monitors the activity of the Town Council,
when the same party dominates both chambers, the mayor’s proposals are almost auto-
matically approved. In our sample, this happens in 78% of the observations. Therefore,
mayors have extensive decision-making autonomy in the allocation of resources. Munic-
ipalities intervene in several areas, namely in water treatment and distribution, sewage,
urban transportation, housing, healthcare, education, heritage, culture, leisure and sports,
spatial planning and urban design, defense of the environment, and protection of the civil-
ian population.
The capacity of municipalities to generate own revenues has been increasing over time,
but transfers from the central government and the European Union still represented 43.3%
of total revenues in 2013, being above 50% for 210 of the 308 municipalities. Therefore,
most Portuguese municipalities are highly dependent on funds transfered from the central
government. More than half of these transfers are unconditional (formula-determined).
But, conditional grants, which involve submitting projects and lobbying for their approval,
still account for almost 20% of total municipal revenues (excluding loans). Thus, lobbying
for transfers is an important activity for most mayors and transfers can be used strategi-
cally by the central government to win elections.14 Municipalities generate own revenues
mainly from local taxes and fees, and from the sale of goods and services. Local tax rates
are proposed by the Town Council to the Municipal Assembly on a yearly basis, and are
subject to the boundaries imposed by the tax law. Municipalities can also obtain loans,
according to limits established by the local public finance law and other regulations.
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3.2. Testable hypotheses
A critical issue regarding the effects of binding term limits on the management of
municipal finances is how those limits change mayors’ incentives. Not being able to stand
for reelection, term-limited mayors are less accountable to voters, which may induce lower
effort and, consequently, worse performance, as predicted in the model of Bonfiglioli and
Gancia (2013) and as shown in several empirical results focusing on US state governors
(Alt et al., 2011; Besley and Case, 1995). Although several Portuguese term-limited
mayors ran for other local offices in the 2013 elections, being still accountable to voters,
many were true lame ducks, simply going away in the end of their mandates. Thus, on
average, accountability concerns were lower for term-limited mayors, possibly inducing
them to exert lower effort (become lazy) over the entire mandate. This leads to our first
testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Term-limited mayors behave differently from reelection-
eligible mayors, namely by exerting lower effort.
Not being worried with reelection, term-limited mayors are also expected to resort
less to opportunistic policies, as shown by Klein and Sakurai (2015) for Brazil. Although
a term-limited mayor may run for other offices or be worried with her party’s result,
Veiga and Veiga (2007) show that Portuguese mayors behave more opportunistically when
they run for reelection than when they do not. Thus, we expect that the pre-electoral
manipulation of local finances (through higher expenditures or lower local taxes),15 is
smaller when the mayor cannot run for reelection. Thus, the second hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 2: Term-limited mayors are less opportunistic than reelection-
eligible ones.
As shown by Besley and Case (1995), term-limited policymakers are not all alike, as
some may run for other offices, and political parties do not cease to exist. This implies that
political reputation may still be important for some lame ducks, originating differences
in behavior among them. Heterogeneous behavior is more likely shortly before elections,
due to differences in electoral incentives among term-limited mayors. In the concrete case
of the 2013 Portuguese municipal elections, and as explained above, there were essentially
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three different types of term-limited mayors: the true lame ducks, the resigning mayors,
and those that ran for further offices. The resigning mayors were replaced by their deputy-
mayors, most of whom ran for mayor in the 2013 elections. Being less known to voters than
the mayors they replaced, and having a short period to enjoy incumbency advantage, they
may have felt greater need to manipulate fiscal policy to boost their election chances.16
Furthermore, mayors who ran for other offices also had greater incentives to implement
electoral policies than the true lame ducks. This leads to our third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Term-limited mayors are not all alike; true lame ducks are
the least opportunistic.
4. Data and Econometric models
To study the effects of binding term limits on local fiscal policy, a large and detailed
panel dataset was built, composed of annual data on fiscal, economic, political and socio-
economic variables for all 308 Portuguese municipalities, from 1998 to 2013. Data on
local finances were collected from the Directorate General of Local Authorities (DGAL)’s
annual publication Municipal Finances (Finanças Municipais) and from DGAL’s website
(www.portalautarquico.pt). Data on election results and on mayors’ characteristics and
terms in office was provided by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, economic and demographic
data was obtained from the National Statistics Institute (INE), and socio-economic indi-
cators from the Pordata database and the Marktest’s Sales Index database. Descriptive
statistics are presented in Table A.2 in the Online Appendix.
Panel data models are estimated for the 308 Portuguese municipalities, covering the
period from 1998 to 2013. This time period covers the four municipal terms ending in
the elections of 2001, 2005, 2009, and 2013. Given that the law restricting the number
of consecutive terms in office entered into force in the beginning of 2006, the sample
period includes two terms before and two terms after that event. But, since the term
limits became binding in the 2013 elections, only the last 4-year term in our sample has
term-limited mayors who cannot run for reelection.
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4.1. Baseline difference-in-differences model
The effects of the introduction of binding term limits on the behavior of Portuguese
mayors are assessed in a difference-in-differences (DD) framework, over the entire sample
period of 1998 to 2013. Since 160 mayors were lame ducks in their 2010-2013 terms, while
the other 148 were reelection-eligible, we can consider the municipalities of the term-
limited mayors as the treatment group, and those of the reelection-eligible ones as the
control group.
This DD framework requires that treated and control municipalities exhibit similar
trends before term limits became binding (in the pre-treatment period). Figure 1 shows
the paths of the averages of the main fiscal variables in municipalities with term-limited
(treated) and reelection-eligible (control) mayors, until 2009. The “common trends hy-
pothesis”, central to the DD framework, seems to be valid for total and current expen-
ditures and revenues, as the lines for the two groups of municipalities exhibit similar
behavior. The means of the budget balance seem to follow a common trend after 2002.
Treated and control municipalities also have somewhat similar trends for capital expen-
ditures and revenues, but there are several years in which they behaved differently. Being
essentially related to investment projects, which are rarely evenly distributed over time,
capital expenditures and revenues are more volatile and do not exhibit a nice and regular
upward trend like current expenditures and revenues. This may help explain why treated
and control municipalities do not always exhibit a similar behavior in these components.
In fact, there is also considerable variation within each of these groups.
Additional tests of the validity of the DD framework consisted on checking, for each
fiscal variable, if treated municipalities behaved differently from the control ones in any
year of the pre-treatment period, or if they followed a different linear trend. This does not
seem to have happened to any of the seven fiscal variables considered above (see Figures
A.1 and A.2 in the Online Appendix), which provides further support for the validity of
our DD framework. The lack of statistical significance of the annual dummies for the
treated municipalities in the period 2006-2009 also suggests that the management of local
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Note: Each line represents the average for each group of municipalities.
Source: Own calculations using data from DGAL.
Figure 1: Trends in the main fiscal variables (1998-2009)
change immediately after the approval of the law imposing term limits (due to eventual
anticipation effects).17
Although most of the above-mentioned checks provide support for the “common trends
hypothesis”, the occasional differences in the means of capital expenditures and revenues
shown in Figure 1 may cast doubts on its applicability to some fiscal variables. Thus,
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we opt to be extra cautious by controlling for municipal specific trends. According to
Angrist and Pischke (2009, 308-323), this allows treatment and control municipalities to
follow different trends in a limited but potentially relevant way.
The baseline DD model, used to test the hypothesis that, on average, term-limited
mayors behave differently (exert lower effort) from reelection-eligible ones (Hypothesis 1),
can be summarized as follows:
ln(fit) =α + δTLit + φTerm1or2it + X
′
itγ + µi + λt + θi.t+ εit. (1)
i = 1, ..., 308 t = 1998, ..., 2013
where ln(fit) is a fiscal variable in municipality i in year t, TLit is a dummy variable
that equals 1 between 2010 and 2013 for the municipalities that have term-limited mayors
(with 3 or more consecutive terms in office), and equals zero otherwise, and the parameter
δ measures the treatment effect. Regarding the control variables, Term1or2it is a dummy
variable that equals one for first- and second-term mayors, to account for mayors’ expe-
rience, and Xit is a vector of other control variables. Finally, µi are the specific effects
of municipality i, λt are time effects (year dummies),
18 θi.t are municipal specific time
trends, and εit is the error term. Vector Xit includes the following set of control variables
that may affect local finances:19
• Left-wing mayor and Independent mayor: these dummy variables control for possible
ideological effects on local fiscal variables.
• Majority: dummy variable that takes the value of one when the mayor’s party has,
simultaneously, majorities in the Town Council and in the Municipal Assembly.
• Unemployment rate (deviation from HP trend): this variable controls for the cyclical
component of a municipality’s economic performance.
• A set of four variables characterizing mayors: age, a dummy variable for female
mayors, a dummy for mayors who live in the municipality, and a dummy for mayors
who were born in the municipality.
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When studying the effects of US gubernatorial term limits, Alt et al. (2011) highlighted
that it is necessary to disentangle accountability effects of elections from competence ef-
fects, which are associated to tenure. They suggest that differences in performance by
reelection-eligible and term-limited incumbents, holding tenure in office constant, identify
accountability effects. Competence/experience effects are identified by differences in per-
formance by incumbents with different terms in office, holding term-limit status constant.
Since the omitted (base) category of mayors in equation 1 is that for reelection-eligible
mayors who have served three or more consecutive terms in office, a statistically significant
δ would be consistent with accountability effects of elections, that is, with term-limited
mayors behaving differently from equally experienced reelection-eligible mayors. Likewise,
a statistically significant φ would indicate experience effects, that is, first- or second-term
mayors behaving differently from their more experienced and also reelection-eligible col-
leagues (the base category).
4.2. Difference-in-differences model for political budget cycles
A modified version of the DD model of equation (1) is used to investigate how binding
term limits affect the magnitude of political budget cycles (Rogoff, 1990; Shi and Svensson,
2006). Based on the evidence of opportunistic manipulation of local public finances in
Portugal (Aidt, Veiga, and Veiga, 2011), we check if the degree of opportunism decreases
when term limits are binding. More concretely, we start by testing the hypothesis that
mayors who have served three or more consecutive terms in office are less opportunistic
when they are term-limited than when they are reelection-eligible (Hypothesis 2). For
that purpose, we add to equation (1) an election-year dummy,20 and its interaction with
the dummy variables for terms in office. The estimated model is now summarized as:
ln(fit) =α + δTLit + β1ELYit + β2(ELYit ∗ TLit) + β3Term1or2it+
β4(ELYit ∗ Term1or2it) + X′itγ + µi + ωt + θi.t+ εit.
(2)
i = 1, ..., 308 t = 1998, ..., 2013
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where ELYit is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in municipal election years
(2001, 2005, 2009 and 2013), and equals zero otherwise, ωt are time effects (mandate
dummies),21 and the remaining variables and parameters are as defined above.
The category left out of equation (2) is, again, that of reelection-eligible mayors who
have served three or more consecutive terms in office. Thus, a statistically significant β2
would indicate that term limits matter for the degree of opportunism. The hypothesis
that term-limited mayors are less opportunistic than reelection-eligible ones (Hypothesis
2) would be consistent with β2 < 0 for municipal expenditures, and β2 > 0 for municipal
revenues (except for loans and transfers). It is worth noting that a model which did not
include Term1or2it and (ELYit∗Term1or2it) would simply compare term-limited mayors
with all reelection-eligible mayors, without controlling for the latter’s experience. Thus,
β2 would reflect, not only the effect of term limits on opportunism, but also differences in
opportunism related to experience.
4.3. Model for political budget cycles with heterogeneous incentives
An extension of the model of equation (2) is used to test Hypothesis 3, which accounts
for eventual heterogeneous electoral incentives of term-limited mayors, due to the differ-
ences in behavior regarding the 2013 municipal elections described in Section 3. Some
mayors resigned before the end of their terms, eventually due to low motivation or pop-
ularity, and handed over the leadership to someone they trusted (their vice-mayors) as a
way of increasing their party’s likelihood of success at the upcoming election. Mayors who
ran for further political office may also have behaved differently from true lame ducks,
as they were aware that their actions would have reputational consequences, and hence
determine the likelihood of winning subsequent elections.
In order to account for the effects of these differences in behavior among mayors,22
we start by creating a categorical variable (ResOther) which reflects the three options
available to a term-limited mayor: it takes the value of one for 21 mayors who resigned
before the end of their terms; equals two for 78 mayors who completed their terms and then
ran for other political offices; and equals zero otherwise (for the 61 true lame ducks). Then,
we expand the model of equation (2) by including interactions of ResOther with TL, ELY
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and TL ∗ ELY . This allows us to analyze the degree of opportunism in municipalities
ran by true lame ducks (ResOther = 0), by term-limited mayors who resigned before the
end of their terms (ResOther = 1), or ran for further political offices (ResOther = 2).
One problem with the estimation of this extended model for PBCs is that ResOther
may be affected by the existence of binding term limits. In fact, the numbers of resigning
mayors and of those running for other offices were considerably higher in the term leading
to the 2013 elections than in the previous terms, and most of those mayors were term-
limited. Thus, it seems clear that binding term limits influenced those decisions, which
implies that ResOther is endogenous and that OLS or fixed effects estimations would lead
to biased coefficients. To overcome this problem, we estimate, by Maximum Likelihood,
a simultaneous equation model which combines a multinomial probit for ResOther with
a linear regression for the fiscal dependent variable.23 In the multinomial probit model
for ResOther we include as independent variables the explanatory variables of the model
for the fiscal variable,24 plus two additional variables (instruments) which are expected to
influence a mayor’s decision to resign or to run for another office, but are not affected by
TL: the share of votes received by the mayor’s party in the previous elections; and, the
number of terms in office of the incumbent mayor.25
5. Empirical results
This section presents the results of panel data fixed effects and simultaneous equa-
tions estimations, with standard errors clustered by municipality (in order to account for
serial correlation), performed on panels comprising all Portuguese municipalities. We use
a difference-in-differences approach to assess accountability and experience effects of elec-
tions, and to check if being eligible for reelection or not affects a mayor’s opportunistic
manipulation of local finances in election years.
5.1. Baseline difference-in-differences models
The first step of the empirical analysis uses a difference-in-differences framework (see
equation 1) to test for the presence of accountability effects of elections, that is, to test
the hypothesis that term-limited mayors behave differently from reelection-eligible ones.
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(Hypothesis 1). More concretely, we check if lame ducks exert lower effort than reelection-
eligible mayors. In order to economize on space, we only report in Table 1 the results for
the dummy variables related to terms in office.26
Table 1: Difference-in-Differences Models for Accountability and Experience
Budget Total Total Total Own Capital
Balance Expenditures Revenues Capital Revenues Grants
(excl. loans) Expenditures (non-formula)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Term-limited mayor (TL) 6.037 -0.057** -0.042** -0.118** -0.052* -0.222*
(0.279) (-2.405) (-2.238) (-2.466) (-1.871) (-1.747)
First- or second term mayor -19.174** 0.016 -0.002 0.015 -0.024 0.038
(-2.161) (1.443) (-0.194) (0.686) (-1.648) (0.654)
Observations 4746 4748 4748 4748 4748 4730
R-squared 0.136 0.479 0.591 0.349 0.626 0.258
Notes: All regressions include municipal and year fixed effects, municipal-specific time trends, and the full set of control
variables. The budget balance is measured in real euros (of 2015) per capita and the remaining fiscal variables are measured
in logs of real euros per capita. Due to missing values for one municipality, the estimations cover 307 municipalities. T-
statistics, based on robust standard errors, clustered by municipality, in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p.<0.10.
The results for the main fiscal aggregates (budget balance,27 total expenditures, and
total revenues excluding loans) are shown in the first three columns of Table 1. No
significant differences in average budget balances between term-limited and reelection-
eligible mayors seem to exist, as the dummy variable for term-limited mayors (TL) is not
statistically significant (column 1). However, term-limited mayors have, on average, 5.7%
lower total expenditures (column 2) and 4.2% lower total revenues excluding loans (column
3) than reelection-eligible mayors. The lower total expenditures are mainly explained by
lower capital expenditures (column 4), of which investment is the main component. The
lower total average revenues of term-limited mayors seem to result from lower own revenues
(column 5) and non-formula capital transfers from the central government (column 6).28
Overall, the results of Table 1 seem to provide support for Hypothesis 1, as they suggest
that lame ducks invest relatively less than reelection-eligible mayors and make a smaller
effort to negotiate with the central government capital grants beyond those that result
from tax sharing and are formula determined. However, as will be shown below (in Table
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2), the relatively lower level of investment by mayors who are stepping down occurs only
in the election year, due to opportunistic measures adopted by reelection-eligible mayors,
but not by lame ducks. Regarding experience effects, there is evidence of lower average
budget balances (or of higher deficits) in municipalities run by less experienced mayors,29
but experience does not seem to matter for the other fiscal variables.30
5.2. Difference-in-differences models for Political Budget Cycles
In order to check if term limits affect the opportunistic manipulation of local finances
in election years, we estimate the extended DD model of equation (2), which interacts an
election-year dummy variable (ELY ) with dummy variables for municipalities with term-
limited mayors (TL) and with less experienced (Term1or2) reelection-eligible mayors.
Table 2 shows the results obtained for the main fiscal aggregates. The estimated marginal
effects of the Election Year for the base category, term-limited and less experienced mayors
are reported in the lower part of the table.
As can be seen from Table 2, in this extended version of the DD model of equation (1),
the dummy variable for term-limited mayors is never statistically significant. Therefore,
during non-election years, lame-ducks seem to behave similarly to re-election elegible
mayors. Consistent with the evidence for PBCs in Portugal found in previous studies
(Aidt, Veiga, and Veiga, 2011; Baleiras and Costa, 2004), budget balances are lower
(or deficits are higher), and total expenditures are higher, for the reference category of
experienced reelection-eligible mayors, in election years than in the remaining years of
the electoral cycle.31 Higher total revenues (excluding loans) in election years may seem
somewhat surprising, but the fact that they increase less than expenditures (3.1 vs. 9.9
percent), is consistent with the adoption of opportunistic measures that deteriorate the
budget balance. It is also worth noting that the rise in revenues results from the tendency
of the central government to increase the global amount of grants in election years. That is,
as found by Veiga and Pinho (2007), grants are managed opportunistically by the central
government. In fact, when formula grants are excluded from total revenues (column 4),
the election year effect on the latter disappears.
The penultimate row of Table 2 reports the estimated marginal effects of the election
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Table 2: Difference-in-Differences (DD) Models for Political Budget Cycles
Budget Total Total Total
Balance Expenditures Revenues Revenues
(excl. loans) (excl. loans and
formula grants)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Election year -77.702*** 0.099*** 0.031*** 0.004
(-6.502) (8.315) (3.657) (0.220)
Term-limited mayor (TL) 1.737 -0.035 -0.024 -0.047
(0.078) (-1.460) (-1.251) (-1.216)
Election year * Term-limited mayor 1.708 -0.105*** -0.109*** -0.089***
(0.073) (-4.890) (-8.655) (-3.769)
First- or second-term mayor -27.069*** 0.029** 0.004 0.024
(-2.914) (2.381) (0.358) (1.248)
Election year * First- or second-term mayor 28.535** -0.038*** -0.012 -0.012
(2.206) (-3.038) (-1.363) (-0.695)
Observations 4746 4748 4748 4746
R-squared 0.119 0.445 0.556 0.372
Marginal effects of Election year
Base category (experienced eligible mayors) -77.702*** 0.099*** 0.031*** 0.004
(-6.502) (8.315) (3.657) (0.220)
Term-limited mayors -75.994*** -0.006 -0.079*** -0.085***
(-3.566) (-0.325) (-7.606) (-4.473)
First- or second-term mayors -49.167*** 0.061*** 0.019*** -0.008
(-4.915) (7.131) (3.002) (-0.590)
Notes: All regressions include municipal and term fixed effects, municipal-specific time trends, and the full set of control
variables. The budget balance is measured in real euros (of 2015) per capita and the remaining fiscal variables are measured
in logs of real euros per capita. Due to missing values for 1 municipality, the estimations cover 307 municipalities. T-
statistics, based on robust standard errors, clustered by municipality, in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p.<0.10.
year for term-limited mayors.32 The latter cut budget balances slightly less than expe-
rienced reelection-eligible mayors (the reference category), do not increase expenditures,
and reduce revenues in election years. As will be shown below (in Table 3), the reduction
in revenues is primarily due to a reduction in non-formula (conditional) grants received
from the central government, and not to opportunistic behavior of term-limited mayors.
The last row of Table 2 shows the marginal effects of Election year for less experienced
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(first- or second-term) reelection-eligible mayors. These seem to be less opportunistic than
their more experienced and also reelection-eligible colleagues, inducing smaller election-
year reductions in budget balances and increases expenditures. Overall, the results are
consistent with Hypothesis 2, as term-limited mayors behave less opportunistically than
also experienced reelection-eligible mayors.
Table 3 reports the results for expenditure and revenue components. Expenditures on
employees and on investment significantly increase during election years in the munici-
palities run by experienced reelection-eligible mayors (the reference category). Although
fiscal revenues are reduced in elections years, they are compensated by increases in non-
formula (conditional) grants received from the central government. These may result from
greater effort or greater political ability and connections of reelection-eligible experienced
mayors, or from the above-referred opportunistic management of grants by the central
government.
The marginal effects of Election year are quite different for the municipalities of term-
limited mayors. First, there is a reduction in the compensation of employees. Second,
there are no significant election-year effects on investment expenditures and fiscal rev-
enues. Third, there is a reduction in non-formula (conditional) grants from the central
government, which helps explain the reduction in total revenues found in Table 2. This
may result from lower effort of these mayors, expressed in a smaller number of applications
for funding and/or weaker lobbying at the central government. It is also possible that the
central government discriminates against municipalities with term-limited mayors when
allocating grants given that it expects lower electoral returns. Thus, binding term limits
seem to affect the behavior of mayors, eliminating the strategic manipulation of wages,
investment, and fiscal revenues to woo the electorate, and the effort to obtain grants from
the central government, providing further support to Hypothesis 2.
As indicated by the results shown in Tables 2 and 3, less experienced reelection-eligible
mayors seem to be less opportunistic than their more experienced and also reelection-
eligible colleagues. Concretely, they increase expenditures and reduce fiscal revenues by
smaller percentages in election years. Additionally, they seem to have a smaller capacity
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Table 3: Difference-in-Differences (DD) Models for Political Budget Cycles: Components of Expenditures
and Revenues
Expenditures Revenues
Compensation Investment Fiscal Non-formula
of Employees Grants
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Election year 0.101*** 0.145*** -0.071*** 0.096**
(15.683) (4.306) (-6.730) (2.188)
Term-limited mayor (TL) 0.036** -0.020 -0.018 -0.070
(2.302) (-0.252) (-0.650) (-0.764)
Election year * Term-limited mayor -0.145*** -0.171*** 0.046*** -0.247***
(-15.203) (-2.628) (2.774) (-3.783)
First- or second-term mayor 0.027*** 0.055 -0.032** 0.053
(3.636) (1.481) (-2.050) (1.145)
Election year * First- or second-term mayor -0.042*** -0.066* 0.038*** -0.052
(-5.822) (-1.942) (3.234) (-1.208)
Observations 4748 4748 4748 4736
R-squared 0.782 0.458 0.720 0.234
Marginal effects of Election year
Base category (experienced eligible mayors) 0.101*** 0.145*** -0.071*** 0.096**
(15.683) (4.306) (-6.730) (2.188)
Term-limited mayors -0.043*** -0.026 -0.024 -0.151***
(-6.040) (-0.446) (-1.515) (-2.904)
First- or second-term mayors 0.059*** 0.079*** -0.033*** 0.045
(13.757) (3.144) (-3.754) (1.256)
Notes: All regressions include municipal and term fixed effects, municipal-specific time trends, and the full set of control
variables. The fiscal variables are measured in logs of real euros (of 2015) per capita. Due to missing values for 1 munic-
ipality, the estimations cover 307 municipalities. T-statistics, based on robust standard errors, clustered by municipality,
in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimated marginal effects for each category when the
other categories are set at zero.
to obtain non-formula related grants from the central government at election years.
It is worth noting that the results of this subsection could be affected by candidate
selection effects. That is, some potential candidates may have decided not to run in 2009,
delaying their candidacy by four years, in order to avoid facing a long-standing incumbent
mayor who would be term-limited in 2013. This could imply a lower average quality of
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challengers in 2009, reducing the need for opportunistic management of fiscal policy prior
to that election. If the effects were sizable, they could reduce the incidence of Political
Budget Cycles (PBCs) in the pre-treatment period (1998-2009). This would lead to a
smaller difference in PBCs before and after term limits became binding in 2013. Thus,
candidate selection effects, by reducing the incidence of PBCs in part of the pre-treatment
period, could lead to a lower estimated treatment effect.33
As complementary evidence to the analysis above, we also estimated a within-mayors
panel model with mayor fixed effects. Essentially, this model checks if the same mayor
shows less effort in the final year of the term in which she is term-limited than in final
years of her previous terms. The results for the main fiscal aggregates are reported in
Table A.5 in the Online Appendix. They are very similar to those reported in Table 2,
reinforcing our conclusion that term-limited mayors exert lower effort to woo the electorate
and obtain less grants from the central government than reelection-eligible mayors.34
5.3. Political budget cycles with heterogeneous incentives
In order to check for heterogeneous behavior of term-limited mayors in election years,
the model of equation (2) was extended by including interactions with the dummy vari-
ables for the mayors that resigned before the end of the term (ResOther = 1) and for
those who ran for other political offices (ResOther = 2). Since the inclusion of several
additional interaction terms makes the tables of results quite long and hard to interpret,
only the estimated marginal effects of Election year are reported in Table 4.35 The results
suggest that true lame ducks are less opportunistic than equally experienced reelection-
eligible mayors (the base category), as they do not increase total expenditures in election
years. The same appears to apply to term-limited mayors who ran for other offices or in
different municipalities, as their estimated marginal effects are quite similar to those for
true lame ducks. Municipalities with resigning term-limited mayors, who handed over the
leadership to the vice-presidents do not face an election year reduction in non-formula
(conditional) grants from the central government, and rely more on revenues from loans.
Although the estimated coefficients for the budget and total expenditures also suggest
greater opportunism, Wald tests do not reject the equality of marginal effects for resign-
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ing and true lame ducks for these two fiscal variables.
Table 4: Extended DD Models for Political Budget Cycles Marginal Effects of Election Year
Budget Total Total Total Revenues Revenues from
Balance Expenditures Revenues Revenues from Financial
(excl. (excl. loans and Non-formula Liabilities
loans) formula grants) Grants (loans)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Base category (experienced -77.520*** 0.100*** 0.032*** 0.005 0.102** 0.737***
reelection-eligible mayors) (-6.735) (8.998) (3.926) (0.288) (2.575) (8.300)
True lame ducks -63.053*** -0.015 -0.083*** -0.105*** -0.207** 0.711***
(-3.042) (-0.593) (-5.162) (-3.442) (-2.281) (2.959)
Resigning lame ducks -138.730* 0.051 -0.074** -0.016 0.212 2.059***
(-1.923) (0.829) (-2.470) (-0.278) (1.335) (4.980)
Lame ducks who ran for -68.994** -0.016 -0.076*** -0.075*** -0.166** 0.690***
other offices (-2.071) (-0.594) (-5.513) (-2.920) (-2.504) (3.004)
First- or second-term -44.299*** 0.057*** 0.019*** -0.010 0.016 0.608***
mayors (-4.511) (6.743) (3.009) (-0.695) (0.464) (8.282)
Observations 4748 4748 4748 4748 4748 4567
Notes: The estimated marginal effects are based on the estimation of a simultaneous equation model which combines a
multinomial probit for ResOther and a linear regression for the fiscal dependent variable. The budget balance is measured
in real euros (of 2015) per capita and the remaining fiscal variables are measured in logs of real euros per capita. T-statistics,
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p.<0.10.
Overall, these results are supportive of Hypothesis 3, as there are differences in the
degree of opportunism among different types of term-limited mayors, with the true lame
ducks not behaving opportunistically. Somewhat surprisingly, those that ran for other
offices were not opportunistic either, eventually because they ran for lower offices or in
different municipalities. The strong opportunistic behavior found in municipalities with
resigning term-limited mayors may be due to the need to signal competence by the former
vice-mayors who replaced the resigning mayors, as practically all of them ran for mayors
in the next elections. Being less known to voters than experienced mayors, and having a
shorter period to show what they are capable of, they might have felt the need to behave
more opportunistically in order to increase the likelihood of being elected in 2013.36
Finally, as indicated by the results shown in Tables 3 and 4, less experienced mayors
seem to behave less opportunistically than, also reelection-eligible, more experienced ones.




Several tests were conducted to check the robustness of the above-described results.37
First, we tried alternative versions of the vector of control variables, such as including
more demographic variables, more mayors’ characteristics, or excluding some or all of
the mayors’ characteristics. Second, we analyzed if the effects of term limits depend on
mayors’ ideology. Third, the robustness of the results for the true lame ducks was checked
by excluding resigning and candidate lame ducks from the sample. Fourth, we replaced the
municipal specific linear time trends with the Hodrick-Prescott trend of the dependent
variable in the estimations. Fifth, we used region specific trends instead of municipal
specific trends in all estimations. Sixth, we removed the 30 municipalities belonging to
the archipelagos of Madeira and Azores. Finally, we estimated the simultaneous equation
models of Table 4 by 2SLS and by GMM, in order to check if our results depended on
the estimation method chosen.38 We also estimated the model by fixed effects, to check
if not taking the endogeneity of ResOther into account affected the results.39 The main
results and conclusions did not change materially in any of these robustness tests.
6. Discussion and conclusion
The analysis of the effects of electoral incentives on local fiscal policy reveals that
municipalities with term-limited mayors have lower expenditures and revenues than those
with reelection-eligible mayors. These are essentially driven by lower investment ex-
penditures and lower attraction of resources from the central government. As both the
preparation of new investment projects and lobbying for conditional (non-formula related)
grants from the central government require considerable effort, our results are consistent
with the hypothesis that a binding term-limit induces lower effort.
These results contrast with those found for US state governors (Alt et al., 2011; Besley
and Case, 1995), but are consistent with the finding that term-limited US state legislators
provide less pork to their constituencies (Aidt and Shvets, 2012). This could be due to
the fact that Portuguese mayors are somewhere between the governors of Besley and Case
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(1995) and Alt et al. (2011), having extensive decision-making autonomy in the allocation
of resources and some ability to raise local taxes, and the legislators of Aidt and Shvets
(2012), in the sense that they compete for the grants from the central government. Since
the results indicate significant differences in non-formula grants from the central govern-
ment between municipalities with term-limited and reelection-eligible mayors, which may
drive the differences in expenditures, the competition effect seems to dominate. This may
happen because the vast majority of Portuguese municipalities has limited ability to raise
own revenues and is largely dependent on grants from the central government.
Regarding political budget cycles, the empirical evidence indicates that lame ducks
manage budget balances and the size and composition of expenditures and revenues in
a less opportunistic manner than experienced reelection-eligible mayors. As indicated by
Besley and Case (1995), term-limited policymakers are not all alike, as some may run for
further office, and parties still exist after the election. Thus, political reputation may not
end with a binding term limit. These differences may become especially evident in election
years, due to differences in electoral incentives of different types of term-limited mayors.
The highest degree of opportunism among municipalities with term-limited mayors was
found in those whose mayors resigned before the end of the term. These municipalities
seem to undertake larger election-year reductions in taxes, matched by greater increases in
financial liabilities (loans), than those of other types of term-limited mayors. This degree
of election year fiscal manipulation, more similar to the behavior of reelection-eligible
mayors, may result from the efforts of the vice-mayors who replaced the resigning mayors,
most of whom ran for mayor in 2013. Since they were in charge for a relatively small period
and were less known by the electorate, they may have felt the need to signal competence.
Our results also indicate that the fiscal policy choices of mayors that ran for president of
the Municipal Assembly of their municipality, or for mayor in another municipality, were
similar to those of true lame ducks. Thus, they were also less opportunistic than equally
experienced reelection-eligible mayors, probably because they ran for a lower office and
were already well known by their constituency, or would be evaluated by inhabitants of
other municipalities.
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Overall, our results clearly indicate that differences in electoral incentives among may-
ors, brought about by binding term limits, help explain differences in the management of
local fiscal policy. We believe our analysis of the effects of the introduction of mayoral
term-limits in Portugal can bring novel insights to a literature that is highly focused on
the US case. First, it may provide useful insights for countries with similar institutional
systems. Second, in Portugal, the institutional reform was exogenously imposed by the
national parliament, and the same law applies to all local governments, rendering the
estimation of the term-limit treatment effect less problematic than for the US, where
states decide on the adoption of term limits, and term-limit laws vary from state to state.
Third, unlike most previous research, we control for the effects of incumbents’ experience
on fiscal policy choices. Finally, the empirical analysis goes beyond the standard public
finance variables and provides evidence on last-period behavior of mayors, for different
types of lame ducks, and other strategies used by term-limited executives to continue a
political career or to provide help to a successor in an upcomig election.
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Veiga, Linda Gonçalves, and Francisco José Veiga. 2007. “Political Business Cycles at the
Municipal Level,” 131 (1-2) Public Choice 45–64.
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Appendix A. Online Appendix
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics on Party Institutionalization
Sample Variables Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
All Election volatility 1,229 4.24 3.42 0.04 28.51
Elections Number of effective parties 1,229 2.01 0.41 1.00 4.45
Number of parties/lists 1,229 4.74 1.26 2.00 11.00
Independent candidates 1,229 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
Independent mayor 1,229 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00
2001 Election volatility 305 5.90 4.17 0.29 28.51
Number of effective parties 305 2.00 0.42 1.32 4.45
Number of parties/lists 305 4.08 0.91 3.00 8.00
Independent candidates 305 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00
Independent mayor 305 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00
2005 Election volatility 308 3.49 3.08 0.27 17.88
Number of effective parties 308 1.98 0.38 1.00 3.57
Number of parties/lists 308 4.21 1.08 2.00 9.00
Independent candidates 308 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00
Independent mayor 308 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00
2009 Election volatility 308 3.29 2.59 0.04 13.92
Number of effective parties 308 1.95 0.37 1.00 3.10
Number of parties/lists 308 5.29 1.12 3.00 10.00
Independent candidates 308 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
Independent mayor 308 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00
2013 Election volatility 308 4.30 3.03 0.34 18.49
Number of effective parties 308 2.09 0.46 1.00 4.45
Number of parties/lists 308 5.38 1.29 3.00 11.00
Independent candidates 308 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
Independent mayor 308 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the Portuguese Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Notes: Election volatility corresponds to the average absolute change in vote shares of all parties/lists since the previous
election. The Laakso and Taagepera (1979) Number of effective parties is equal to 1 over the sum of the squared vote shares
of the parties/lists. Independent candidates is a dummy for the presence of independent lists of candidates. Independent
mayor is a dummy for incumbent independent mayors.
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Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics
VARIABLES N. Obs. Mean SD Min Max
Fiscal variables (in real euros per capita, at 2015 prices)
Budget Balance 4923 -25.71 160.90 -3955.61 1301.34
Total Expenditures 4925 1076.16 591.39 173.66 8614.36
Total Current Expenditures 4925 593.72 318.01 91.94 2868.39
Compensation of Employees 4925 292.67 179.30 18.78 1888.96
Total Capital Expenditures 4925 482.44 355.61 45.54 6656.47
Investment Expenditures 4925 333.92 285.03 4.19 6289.28
Total Revenues (excluding Loans) 4925 994.70 531.46 199.93 8320.12
Total Current Revenues 4925 638.11 295.64 129.27 2734.77
Fiscal Revenues 4925 159.70 141.80 6.16 1566.25
Total Capital Revenues (excluding Loans) 4,925 356.35 301.82 2.07 6536.90
Non-formula Grants 4925 187.62 196.57 0.00 5404.80
Loans (Financial liabilities) 4925 83.85 186.44 0.00 7164.29
Own Revenues 4925 296.00 196.57 38.45 2660.42
Term and election variables
Number of terms (mayor) 4916 2.62 1.77 0.00 10.00
Term-limited mayor (TL) 4928 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00
Resign (ResOther = 1 ) 4928 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00
Run Other Office (ResOther = 2 ) 4928 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
First- or second term mayor 4928 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00
Election year 4928 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00
Main control variables
Left-wing mayor 4928 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
Independent Mayor 4928 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00
Majority 4928 0.78 0.41 0.00 1.00
Unemployment rate - deviation from HP trend (in p.p.) 4824 0.03 0.71 -7.33 4.24
Mayors’ characteristics
Age 4887 51.71 8.12 28.00 78.00
Lives in the municipality 4853 0.92 0.28 0.00 1.00
Born in the municipality 4887 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00
Female 4899 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00
Sources: Directorate General for Local Authorities (DGAL), Ministry of Internal Affairs, National Institute of Statistics
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Note: The graphs show the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals of year dummies for the treated municipalities
in the pre-treatment period (1998-2009). The estimated models also include municipality and year fixed effects. The budget
balance is in euros per capita, while the other variables are in logs of euros per capita.































Note: This figure shows the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals of linear trends for the treated municipalities
in the pre-treatment period (1998-2009), obtained in regressions for each fiscal variable, which included municipality and
year fixed effects. Expenditure and revenue variables are in logs of real euros per capita. The budget balance (in real euros
per capita) was divided by 1000 in order to fit the same scale (in the vertical axis) as the logs of the other variables.
Figure A.2: Linear Trend for the Treated Group in the Pre-Treatment Period
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Table A.3: Probability of running for reelection (1997-2009)
(1) (2)
Probit Probit Random Effects
Existence of term limits (dummy for 2009 elections) 0.177 0.181
(1.36) (1.32)
Mayor’s age -0.0271*** -0.0335***
(-3.96) (-4.25)
Mayor lives in the municipality -0.352* -0.303
(-1.84) (-1.50)
Mayor born in the municipality 0.0890 0.123
(0.85) (1.09)
Female mayor 0.960** 0.991**
(2.29) (2.20)
Majority in both the Municipal Council and the Municipal Assembly 0.219* 0.235*
(1.81) (1.86)
Number of consecutive terms in office -0.0976*** -0.126***
(-2.98) (-2.59)
Mayor’s margin of victory (previous election) 0.00159 0.00245
(0.40) (0.57)
Party similarity (mayor and prime minister) 0.0152 0.0179
(0.09) (0.09)
Presence of independent lists -0.178* -0.183*
(-1.69) (-1.69)
Left-wing mayor 0.0994 0.0620
(0.61) (0.30)




Population growth (absolute value) 0.0151 0.0115
(0.96) (0.67)
Share of population with less than primary education 0.00357 -0.00995
(0.25) (-0.61)
Average past turnout 0.00969 -0.00183
(1.04) (-0.15)
Regional (NUTS III) fixed effects No Yes
Observations 1170 1170
Log-likelihood -452.9 -444.5
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses (standard errors clustered by municipality). Significance level: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p.<0.10.
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Table A.4: Difference-in-Differences Models for Accountability and Experience - Full model
Budget Total Total Total Own Capital
Balance Expenditures Revenues Capital Revenues Grants
(excl. loans) Expenditures (non-formula)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Term-limited mayor (TL) 6.037 -0.057** -0.042** -0.118** -0.052* -0.222*
(0.279) (-2.405) (-2.238) (-2.466) (-1.871) (-1.747)
First- or second term mayor -19.174** 0.016 -0.002 0.015 -0.024 0.038
(-2.161) (1.443) (-0.194) (0.686) (-1.648) (0.654)
Left-wing -6.149 -0.001 -0.000 0.031 0.010 0.132
(-0.437) (-0.064) (-0.016) (0.945) (0.455) (1.404)
Independent -36.277 0.051 0.033 0.102 0.047 0.219*
(-0.923) (1.108) (0.856) (1.302) (0.806) (1.670)
Majority -3.578 0.010 0.004 0.032 0.023 0.064
(-0.341) (0.923) (0.509) (1.522) (1.624) (1.132)
Unemployment rate 0.126 -0.008* -0.007** -0.019** 0.001 -0.025
(deviation from HP trend) (0.025) (-1.902) (-2.129) (-2.122) (0.068) (-1.104)
Age -0.581 0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.008
(-0.769) (0.730) (0.118) (1.255) (-0.952) (1.625)
Lives in the municipality 24.401 -0.009 -0.008 -0.024 0.008 -0.015
(1.050) (-0.339) (-0.489) (-0.462) (0.323) (-0.112)
Born in the municipality 40.429** -0.003 0.023 -0.017 0.013 0.087
(2.141) (-0.153) (1.500) (-0.430) (0.697) (0.846)
Female -5.878 0.039 0.021 0.102 0.036 -0.006
(-0.251) (1.175) (0.726) (1.522) (0.964) (-0.037)
Observations 4746 4748 4748 4748 4748 4730
R-squared 0.136 0.479 0.591 0.349 0.626 0.258
Notes: All regressions include municipal and year fixed effects, and municipal-specific time trends. The budget balance is
measured in real euros (of 2015) per capita and the remaining fiscal variables are measured in logs of real euros per capita.
Due to missing values for one municipality, the estimations cover 307 municipalities. T-statistics, based on robust standard
errors, clustered by municipality, in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p.<0.10.
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Table A.5: Difference-in-Differences (DD) Models for Political Budget Cycles (Within-mayors panel)
Budget Total Total Total
Balance Expenditures Revenues Revenues
(excl. loans) (excl. loans and
formula grants)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Election year -80.688*** 0.102*** 0.031*** 0.001
(-6.814) (8.753) (3.692) (0.047)
Term-limited mayor (TL) -10.181 -0.013 -0.010 -0.022
(-0.381) (-0.526) (-0.496) (-0.592)
Election year * Term-limited mayor 10.851 -0.109*** -0.106*** -0.079***
(0.468) (-5.068) (-8.073) (-3.277)
First- or second-term mayor -22.013* 0.033** 0.011 0.020
(-1.857) (2.223) (0.846) (0.818)
Election year * First- or second-term mayor 35.421*** -0.045*** -0.013 -0.011
(2.720) (-3.673) (-1.469) (-0.612)
Observations 4746 4748 4748 4746
R-squared 0.141 0.383 0.491 0.274
Number of mayors 611 611 611 611
Marginal effects of Election year
Base category (experienced eligible mayors) -80.688*** 0.102*** 0.031*** 0.001
(-6.814) (8.753) (3.692) (0.047)
Term-limited mayors -69.836*** -0.007 -0.076*** -0.078***
(-3.293) (-0.366) (-6.927) (-3.914)
First- or second-term mayor -45.266*** 0.056*** 0.018*** -0.010
(-4.586) (6.576) (2.731) (-0.729)
Notes: All regressions include mayor and term fixed effects, municipal-specific time trends, and the full set of control
variables. The budget balance is measured in real euros (of 2015) per capita and the remaining fiscal variables are measured
in logs of real euros per capita. T-statistics, based on robust standard errors, clustered by mayor, in parentheses. Significance
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Note: Estimated marginal effects with 90% confidence intervals. The budget balance is measured in real euros (of 2015)
per capita and the remaining fiscal variables are measured in logs of real euros per capita.
Figure A.3: Extended DD Model for PBCs: Marginal Effects of Election Year
40
Table A.6: Extended DD Models for Political Budget Cycles - Linear Regression
Budget Total Total Total Revenues Revenues Revenues from
Balance Expenditures Revenues (excl. loans from Financial
(excl. and Non-formula Liabilities
loans) formula grants) Grants (loans)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Election year -77.520*** 0.100*** 0.032*** 0.005 0.102** 0.737***
(-6.735) (8.998) (3.926) (0.288) (2.575) (8.300)
Term-limited mayor -1.512 0.000 0.018 0.019 0.390*** -0.446**
(-0.097) (0.021) (0.878) (0.282) (2.792) (-2.322)
Election year*Term-limited mayor 14.467 -0.115*** -0.116*** -0.111*** -0.309*** -0.026
(0.650) (-4.391) (-6.672) (-3.377) (-3.241) (-0.111)
Resigning mayor -12.480 0.003 -0.004 -0.152** -0.805*** -1.957***
(-0.541) (0.102) (-0.175) (-2.044) (-2.904) (-6.074)
Run for other office 1.497 -0.018 -0.019 0.081 -0.490 0.524*
(0.066) (-0.668) (-0.954) (0.455) (-1.580) (1.795)
Election year * Resigning mayor -81.847 0.072** 0.012 0.038 0.195* 0.459**
(-1.416) (1.980) (0.407) (0.631) (1.747) (2.089)
Election year * Run for other office -17.872 -0.032 -0.042 -0.101* -0.366*** -0.143
(-0.656) (-0.958) (-1.577) (-1.713) (-2.650) (-0.584)
Term-limited mayor * Resigning mayor -9.411 -0.066 -0.088** -0.056 -0.373 0.838**
(-0.354) (-1.588) (-2.384) (-0.582) (-1.616) (2.372)
Term-limited mayo r* Run for other office -8.089 0.035 0.020 -0.047 0.023 0.285
(-0.281) (1.011) (0.699) (-0.612) (0.133) (1.018)
Election year * Term-limited mayor * 6.170 -0.007 -0.002 0.051 0.224 0.889*
Resigning mayor (0.065) (-0.090) (-0.044) (0.594) (1.057) (1.720)
Election year * Term-limited mayor * 11.931 0.031 0.049 0.131* 0.407** 0.121
Run for other office (0.248) (0.623) (1.466) (1.854) (2.309) (0.307)
First- or second term mayor -19.932*** 0.012 -0.008 -0.003 -0.029 0.043
(-2.654) (1.061) (-0.915) (-0.136) (-0.605) (0.585)
Election year*First- or second 33.221*** -0.043*** -0.014* -0.015 -0.086** -0.129
term mayor (2.665) (-3.647) (-1.659) (-0.886) (-2.199) (-1.422)
Left-wing 11.180 -0.002 0.008 0.034 0.073 0.019
(1.220) (-0.114) (0.641) (1.339) (1.331) (0.286)
Majority 1.922 0.018 0.014 0.025 0.019 0.035
(0.250) (1.627) (1.572) (1.482) (0.396) (0.517)
Unemployment rate 7.392** -0.033*** -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.013 -0.104***
(deviation from HP trend) (2.065) (-8.206) (-8.951) (-4.691) (-0.823) (-3.113)
Age -0.105 -0.002** -0.002*** -0.003* -0.004 -0.010**
(-0.237) (-2.000) (-2.816) (-1.915) (-1.392) (-2.574)
Lives in the municipality 7.191 0.015 0.016 0.028 -0.027 0.148
(0.509) (0.627) (0.866) (0.832) (-0.402) (1.528)
Born in the municipality 26.206** 0.002 0.018 0.016 0.010 0.020
(2.356) (0.101) (1.335) (0.550) (0.157) (0.294)
Female 0.481 0.005 -0.012 -0.006 -0.024 -0.251**
(0.025) (0.177) (-0.514) (-0.148) (-0.290) (-2.033)
Observations 4748 4748 4748 4748 4748 4567
Notes: Linear regression results of the estimation of a simultaneous equation model which also includes a multinomial probit
for ResOther. The budget balance is measured in real euros (of 2015) per capita and the remaining fiscal variables are
measured in logs of real euros per capita. All regressions include municipal and term fixed effects, and region-specific time
trends. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p.<0.10.
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Table A.7: Extended DD Models for Political Budget Cycles - Multinomial Probit
Budget Total Total Total Revenues Revenues from Revenues from
Balance Expenditures Revenues (excl. loans and Non-formula Financial
(excl. loans) formula grants) Grants Liabilities (loans)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probability that a mayor resigns before the end of the term (ResOther=1)
Term-limited mayor 1.590*** 1.401*** 1.415*** 1.247*** 1.142*** 1.150***
(6.224) (5.992) (6.132) (4.744) (4.293) (5.035)
Election year -0.226*** -0.182*** -0.170 -0.236*** -0.272*** -0.209***
(-3.994) (-2.834) (-1.599) (-3.765) (-4.687) (-2.965)
First- or second term mayor -1.011*** -0.965*** -0.960*** -1.055*** -1.024*** -0.939***
(-3.412) (-3.563) (-3.528) (-3.499) (-3.553) (-3.251)
N. Terms mayor -0.444*** -0.424*** -0.416*** -0.455*** -0.435*** -0.409***
(-3.216) (-3.632) (-3.857) (-3.527) (-3.417) (-2.912)
% Votes in previous election 0.006 0.006 0.005 -0.002 0.002 0.004
(0.396) (0.444) (0.368) (-0.136) (0.161) (0.338)
Left-wing 0.311* 0.266 0.253 0.300* 0.276 0.299*
(1.683) (1.495) (1.360) (1.648) (1.602) (1.817)
Majority -0.191 -0.211 -0.203 -0.173 -0.173 -0.224
(-0.790) (-0.979) (-0.849) (-0.693) (-0.718) (-0.981)
Unemployment rate -0.066 -0.080 -0.079 -0.059 -0.018 -0.030
(deviation from HP trend) (-1.060) (-1.439) (-1.291) (-0.907) (-0.270) (-0.482)
Age -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 0.001
(-0.138) (-0.296) (-0.333) (-0.390) (-0.187) (0.051)
Lives in the municipality -0.186 -0.130 -0.089 -0.219 -0.220 -0.171
(-0.670) (-0.447) (-0.313) (-0.772) (-0.798) (-0.630)
Born in the municipality -0.222 -0.237 -0.239 -0.258 -0.145 -0.032
(-1.265) (-1.423) (-1.402) (-1.268) (-0.829) (-0.188)
Female -0.349 -0.259 -0.189 -0.168 -0.098 -0.170
(-1.115) (-0.748) (-0.576) (-0.546) (-0.349) (-0.611)
Probability that a mayor runs for other offices after the end of the current term (ResOther=2)
Term-limited mayor 0.864*** 0.276*** 0.319*** 0.009*** 0.141** 0.015
(8.894) (12.120) (12.061) (9.243) (2.055) (1.298)
Election year 0.002 -0.011** -0.011 0.000 0.001 -0.000
(0.178) (-2.167) (-1.039) (0.776) (0.618) (-0.357)
First- or second term mayor -0.290*** -0.086*** -0.099*** -0.003** -0.041 -0.005
(-2.746) (-3.344) (-3.207) (-2.177) (-1.623) (-1.132)
N. Terms mayor -0.023 -0.014** -0.016** 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(-0.596) (-2.016) (-2.009) (0.100) (0.063) (-0.663)
% Votes in previous election 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000
(1.570) (1.363) (1.224) (1.546) (1.055) (0.960)
Left-wing 0.007 0.013 0.015 -0.000 -0.006 0.000
(0.106) (0.851) (0.744) (-0.303) (-0.586) (0.069)
Majority -0.082 -0.030 -0.034 -0.001 -0.013 -0.001
(-0.844) (-1.387) (-1.235) (-0.851) (-0.751) (-0.741)
Unemployment rate 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(deviation from HP trend) (0.406) (0.223) (0.087) (0.742) (0.159) (0.293)
Age -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.204) (-0.134) (-0.134) (-0.250) (-0.090) (-0.341)
Lives in the municipality -0.095 -0.032 -0.034 -0.001 -0.010 -0.002
(-1.045) (-1.350) (-1.205) (-0.914) (-0.589) (-0.955)
Born in the municipality -0.067 -0.026* -0.030 -0.001 -0.012 -0.001
(-1.201) (-1.855) (-1.529) (-1.110) (-1.075) (-0.881)
Female -0.155 -0.055* -0.058 -0.001 -0.025 -0.002
(-1.334) (-1.672) (-1.499) (-1.020) (-1.090) (-0.888)
Observations 4748 4748 4748 4748 4748 4567
Notes: Multinomial probit results. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p.<0.10.
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Table A.8: Extended DD Models for Political Budget Cycles - Marginal Effects of Election Year (Esti-
mation of IV Models using 2SLS and GMM)
Budget Total Total Total Revenues from Revenues from
Balance Expenditures Revenues Revenues Non-formula Financial
(excl. loans) (excl. loans and Grants Liabilities
formula grants) (loans)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV Estimation using 2SLS
Base category (experienced -83.349*** 0.134*** 0.055*** 0.044* 0.180*** 0.839***
reelection-eligible mayors) (-5.782) (7.758) (4.228) (1.724) (3.113) (7.323)
True lame ducks -63.182*** -0.013 -0.082*** -0.097** -0.198** 0.745***
(-2.693) (-0.447) (-3.834) (-2.319) (-2.113) (3.257)
Resigning lame ducks -137.042*** 0.033 -0.091*** -0.079 0.012 1.604***
(-3.522) (0.700) (-2.579) (-1.143) (0.080) (4.326)
Lame ducks who ran for -69.114*** -0.014 -0.074*** -0.071* -0.142* 0.574***
other offices (-3.349) (-0.586) (-3.961) (-1.951) (-1.726) (2.755)
First- or second-term -46.609*** 0.070*** 0.028*** 0.008 0.059 0.678***
mayors (-4.706) (5.946) (3.096) (0.456) (1.496) (8.089)
Observations 4746 4748 4748 4746 4736 3592
IV Estimation using GMM
Base category (experienced -83.928*** 0.133*** 0.054*** 0.039 0.182*** 0.864***
reelection-eligible mayors) (-6.240) (7.877) (4.200) (1.580) (3.307) (7.803)
True lame ducks -63.360*** -0.012 -0.081*** -0.096*** -0.196** 0.730***
(-3.255) (-0.457) (-4.107) (-2.689) (-2.120) (3.097)
Resigning lame ducks -133.757** 0.036 -0.089*** -0.080 0.016 1.641***
(-2.199) (0.637) (-2.949) (-1.429) (0.106) (4.571)
Lame ducks who ran for -69.893** -0.014 -0.074*** -0.073** -0.142* 0.602***
other offices (-2.346) (-0.550) (-4.172) (-2.260) (-1.723) (2.688)
First- or second-term -46.682*** 0.070*** 0.027*** 0.007 0.063 0.693***
mayors (-4.964) (6.045) (3.134) (0.416) (1.597) (8.221)
Observations 4746 4748 4748 4746 4736 3592
Notes: The estimated marginal effects are based on the estimation of an Instrumental Variables (IV) model combining a
first-stage regression for ResOther and a second stage for the fiscal dependent variable. The budget balance is measured in
real euros (of 2015) per capita and the remaining fiscal variables are measured in logs of real euros per capita. T-statistics,
based on robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p.<0.10.
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Table A.9: Extended DD Models for Political Budget Cycles - Fixed Effects Estimations
Budget Total Total Total Revenues from Revenues from
Balance Expenditures Revenues Revenues Non-formula Financial
(excl. loans) (excl. loans and Grants Liabilities
formula grants) (loans)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Election year -77.499*** 0.101*** 0.033*** 0.008 0.122*** 0.726***
(-6.700) (9.055) (4.027) (0.413) (2.963) (8.241)
Term-limited mayor -1.876 -0.019 -0.002 -0.006 0.096 -0.327
(-0.123) (-0.835) (-0.113) (-0.149) (1.120) (-1.638)
Election year * Term-limited mayor 14.493 -0.114*** -0.115*** -0.105*** -0.322*** 0.030
(0.649) (-4.337) (-6.616) (-3.233) (-3.348) (0.123)
Resigning mayor -10.142 0.027 0.033 0.058 0.063 -0.055
(-0.587) (1.049) (1.352) (1.129) (0.552) (-0.312)
Run for other office 2.180 0.050* 0.044** 0.080** 0.226** 0.158
(0.107) (1.824) (2.285) (1.973) (2.589) (0.921)
Election year * Resigning mayor -82.151 0.070* 0.007 0.012 0.092 0.206
(-1.399) (1.909) (0.254) (0.202) (0.822) (0.924)
Election year * Run for other office -17.833 -0.037 -0.045* -0.102* -0.376*** -0.044
(-0.652) (-1.060) (-1.700) (-1.726) (-2.700) (-0.157)
Term-limited mayor * Resigning mayor -9.756 -0.054 -0.078** -0.100 -0.311* 0.299
(-0.355) (-1.275) (-2.079) (-1.449) (-1.760) (0.714)
Term-limited mayor * Run for other office -8.305 0.006 -0.006 -0.024 -0.163 0.170
(-0.290) (0.186) (-0.199) (-0.452) (-1.311) (0.655)
Election year * Term-limited mayor * Resigning mayor 5.883 -0.011 -0.008 0.020 0.142 0.699
(0.062) (-0.148) (-0.174) (0.234) (0.654) (1.389)
Election year * Term-limited mayor * Run for other office 11.918 0.034 0.053 0.127* 0.431** -0.118
(0.247) (0.685) (1.569) (1.803) (2.438) (-0.272)
First- or second term mayor -19.846*** 0.015 -0.005 0.003 0.027 0.099
(-2.658) (1.353) (-0.545) (0.151) (0.651) (1.234)
Election year * First- or second term mayor 33.240*** -0.044*** -0.014* -0.014 -0.086** -0.090
(2.654) (-3.679) (-1.704) (-0.797) (-2.168) (-0.998)
Observations 4746 4748 4748 4746 4736 3592
R-squared 0.055 0.323 0.435 0.220 0.091 0.054
Sensitivity tests of significant coefficients
Election year 0.58 1.41 1.32 15.05 0.45
Election year * Term-limited mayor -1.79 -3.78 -0.65 -1.10
Run for other office 0.81 0.86 0.40 0.32
Election year * Resigning mayor 2.96
Election year * Run for other office -1.24 0.81 0.32
Term-limited mayor * Resigning mayor -10.75 1.51
Election year * Term-limited mayor * Run for other office 0.56 -2.98
Election year * First- or second term mayor -0.30 -0.77 -0.79 -0.42
Marginal effects
Base category (experienced reelection-eligible mayors) -77.499*** 0.101*** 0.033*** 0.008 0.122*** 0.726***
(-6.700) (9.055) (4.027) (0.413) (2.963) (8.241)
True lame ducks -63.006*** -0.013 -0.082*** -0.097*** -0.199** 0.757***
(-3.029) (-0.514) (-5.045) (-3.239) (-2.199) (3.011)
Resigning lame ducks -139.274* 0.046 -0.082*** -0.064 0.035 1.661***
(-1.937) (0.739) (-2.746) (-1.157) (0.214) (4.192)
Lame ducks who ran for other offices -68.920** -0.015 -0.074*** -0.072*** -0.143** 0.595**
(-2.059) (-0.558) (-5.390) (-2.841) (-2.155) (2.479)
First- or second-term mayors -44.259*** 0.057*** 0.019*** -0.006 0.037 0.636***
(-4.494) (6.829) (3.098) (-0.451) (1.060) (8.469)
Notes: The budget balance is measured in real euros (of 2015) per capita and the remaining fiscal variables are measured in
logs of real euros per capita. T-statistics, based on robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p.<0.10. The sensitivity tests were performed using the Stata command psacalc (see Oster, 2017). They report
the value of proportional selection, δ, such that the effect of the coefficient is equal to zero
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Notes
1 Original models of political business cycles (i.e., Nordhaus 1975; MacRae 1977) posited that govern-
ments would increase the money supply growth in the year prior to an election to temporarily raise output
and employment. Voters would react positively, not realizing that after the election inflation would rise,
and output and employment would return to their natural rates. With the rational expectations revolu-
tion the existence of an exploitable Phillips curve and the idea that voters can be systematically fooled
before elections became untenable. Rational expectations were first introduced in the electoral cycle in
macroeconomic policy by Rogoff and Sibert (1988).
2 See Aaskoven and Lassen (2017) for a recent survey, and Veiga, Veiga, and Morozumi (2017) for
a recent empirical analysis of the relative importance of factors influencing PBCs on a large panel of
countries.
3 In variants of the model, government spending can also be manipulated and loans can be contracted
to finance the deficit.
4 Empirical results for the effects of term limits in US state legislatures on spending are mixed (Bails
and Tieslau, 2000; Erler, 2007; Reed et al., 1998). However, term limits seem to negatively impact on
states’ fiscal deficits (Cummins, 2012) and bond ratings (Lewis, 2012). Recently, doubts were raised on
the research design of previous studies, because they did not take into account that the variables which
predict the introduction of term limits in a given state may also influence budgetary decisions. When
using the synthetic case control method to account for heterogeneity in the probability of treatment,
there is little evidence that term limits on legislators affect state spending (Keele et al., 2013).
5 By focusing on just four fiscal policy variables (related to current expenditures and fiscal revenues),
and not accounting for the experience of mayors and heterogeneity among term-limited mayors, this
working paper’s analysis is considerably narrower in scope than ours. Additionally, grants from the
central government, which are the main source of revenue for the majority of Portuguese municipalities,
are not considered either.
6 Administrative regions were established only in the archipelagos of Azores and Madeira. Local
governments include the municipal and parish levels, with each municipality including several parishes
(freguesias). The latter have a very limited number of functions and resources, and detailed fiscal data
at the parish level are not available.
7 This was the case of 31 (5.1%) of the 611 mayors covered in our dataset. Since we do not have
information on all candidates, we do not know how many ran for two or more different parties/lists over
their careers, but we suspect that they account for considerably more than 5% of the total.
8 Personal incumbency advantage refers to an electoral edge enjoyed by in-office persons and has been
studied by many scholars (e.g., Ansolabehere and Snyder Jr. 2004; Mathew 2008; Fowler and Hall 2014).
9 Descriptive statistics of party institutionalization indicators are presented in Table A.1 of the Online
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Appendix. Although electoral volatility is not high, especially when compared to the values reported
by Mainwaring and Torcal (2006) and Jones (2011) for some Latin American countries, the number of
parties/lists is sometimes high (10 or 11), and there is a growing number of independent lists of citizens
running (and winning) in Portuguese municipal elections.
10 By 2013, 31 mayors had been in office for 20 years or more, with two municipalities (Braga and Vila
Nova de Poiares) having the same mayor from 1976 to 2013 (for 10 consecutive terms).
11 There were also proposals to apply term limits to the prime minister and to the presidents of regional
governments, but the required two-thirds majority in parliament to approve them was not obtained. It
is also worth noting that there were no changes in budgetary procedures or in the competences of the
municipalities in response to this law.
12 The transitory provision that allowed all mayors to run in 2009 was a demand of PPD-PSD, that
had the highest number of term-limited mayors. It was essentially a way of maintaining control of a large
number of municipalities for four additional years.
13 By resigning, a mayor does not regain eligibility for election, but gives some incumbency advantage
to the vice-mayor who seeks election. We do not treat as resigning five mayors who stepped down just four
months or less before the elections, as they practically concluded their terms and did not give their vice-
mayors enough time to introduce changes in local fiscal policy or to benefit from incumbency advantage.
Seven resigning mayors who also ran for other offices are treated simply as resigning mayors, so that
there is no overlap between the three types of term-limited mayors considered in the empirical analysis.
14 There is evidence that, in Portugal, intergovernmental transfers increase during election years and
that these increases pay off in terms of electoral support(Veiga and Pinho, 2007; Veiga, 2012; Veiga and
Veiga, 2013).
15 See Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) for rational expectations models in which the
incumbent policymaker opportunistically distorts fiscal variables in order to signal greater competence
to the electorate shortly before elections.
16 Candidates running as incumbents tend to perform better in elections than other candidates (An-
solabehere and Snyder Jr., 2004; Mathew, 2008; Fowler and Hall, 2014; Lopes da Fonseca, 2016). Several
reasons may explain this statistical fact (Mathew, 2008). First, due to holding office, the incumbent
may acquire access to skills, resources, and prerogatives. Second, the experience acquired in running the
previous election campaign may help in winning the next one. Third, voters’ risk averseness and inertia
may give an edge to the incumbent. Fourth, incumbent politicians may be better competitors than the
opponents they face, that is, they may hold an innate superior talent.
17 The approval of the law in July 2005 could also have affected early retirements during the term
leading to the 2005 and 2009 elections. That is, the fact that some mayors knew that they would be
term-limited soon could have led them to retire before the law became binding, which could bias our
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results. This does not seem to have happened. First, the percentages of mayors running for reelection
in 2005 and 2009 were the second and third highest ever (83.1% and 85.1%, respectively), only slightly
behind that of 2001 (85.9%). Second, only nine(six) of the mayors elected in 2001(2005) resigned before
the 2005(2009) elections, which are lower numbers of resignations than in the term leading to the 2001
elections, in which 13 mayors resigned. Finally, when estimating probit models for the probability of
running for reelection in the elections before 2013, the dummy variable for the existence of term limits is
not statistically significant (see Table A.3 in the Online Appendix).
18 These year dummies account for events that affected all municipalities at the same time, including the
approval and entry into force of the law introducing term limits. Their inclusion allows us to distinguish
between the effects of having a term-limited mayor (given by δ) and those of the existence of term limits
(captured by the year dummies, λt).
19 An initial version of vector Xit also included population density, the percentages of the population
below 15 years old and above 65 years old, and a dummy variable for mayors who hold a university
degree. But, Variance of Inflated Factors (VIF) tests indicate that demographic variables create problems
of multicollinearity. Since the sample period is relatively short, there is little variation in demographic
variables, which results in collinearity with the municipal fixed effects. Additionally, due to lack of
information on the academic degrees of several mayors, the dummy for mayors with a university degree
has many missing values, and its inclusion in the model leads to the exclusion of 14 municipalities.
Although the inclusion of these control variables does not significantly affect the main results (available
from the authors upon request), we prefer to exclude them.
20 It is possible that there are some non-distortionary cyclical expenditures which coincide with the
election period. These would bias the coefficient of the election-year dummy upwards in regressions for
expenditure items, indicating a higher degree of opportunism. Although we cannot completely rule out
this possibility, and the coefficient should be interpreted as an upper bound measure of the degree of
opportunism, we believe that most of the non-distortionary cyclical expenditures are captured by the set
of control variables, and that the bias is small.
21 Since the election year dummy would be collinear with the year dummies, 4-year mandate dummies
(for each election cycle) are included instead of the year dummies.
22 Besley and Case (1995) analysed similar situations for US governors.
23 Given the three choices available to term-limited mayors, the determinants of the probability of
choosing one option over another are better estimated using a multinomial probit model than with a
linear model. According to Roodman (2011), the estimation of a model which uses the information about
the limited nature of the earlier stage dependent variable is more efficient than a 2SLS estimation, which
would treat it as if it were continuous and unbounded. Roodman (2011)’s cmp command for Stata is
used in our estimations. Nevertheless, as a robustness check, we also estimate the model by 2SLS and
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GMM, obtaining very similar results.
24 Including municipal fixed effects and municipal specific trends leads to a very high number of
variables, which frequently implies that convergence is not achieved. In order to achieve convergence in
the ML estimations, we replaced the 307 municipal specific trends with 25 regional specific trends. As
indicated in the robustness tests section, doing the same in the models of equations (1) or (2) does not
significantly change the results.
25 The results of our models that assess heterogeneous effects of term limits among mayors should
be interpreted with caution. The causal interpretation of the interaction effects is problematic, and
regression analysis with non-experimental data is likely to produce biased estimates that overstate the
effects (Bullock et al., 2010). This may happen because control variables are affected by the treatment or
due to the omission of unobserved variables that affect interaction variables. Despite our efforts to avoid
endogeneity and omitted variable bias problems, we acknowledge that, given the use of non-experimental
data, some bias may still exist.
26 The full estimation results are reported in Table A.4 in the Online Appendix.
27 Since local finance data is reported on a cash basis, total revenues equal total expenditures. The
budget balance is then obtained by excluding the transactions in financial assets and liabilities from the
totals of revenues and expenditures.
28 As mentioned above, the vast majority of Portuguese municipalities is highly dependent on grants
from the central government. Since part of these grants involve a considerable amount of work preparing
investment projects and lobbying for their approval, lower effort may translate into smaller numbers of
project submissions and approvals. The main direct expected effect in the municipal accounts is lower
revenues from central government conditional transfers.
29 Including two separate dummies for first- and second-term mayors leads to a similar conclusion.
30 The coefficients of time dummies and of the municipal trends, which are not reported to economize
space, are jointly statistically significant. Additionally, F-tests indicate that the fixed effects model is
more appropriate than pooled-OLS, and Hausman tests indicate that it is preferable to random effects.
All results not shown in the paper are available from the authors upon request.
31 The budget balance is reduced by 77.7 euros per capita, while expenditures increase by 9.9 percent
(note that they are measured in logs), relative to the other years of the electoral cycle.
32 The overall election year effect for term-limited mayors corresponds to the sum of the coefficients
for Election year and for Election year*Term-limited mayor.
33 We believe that candidate entry selection effects were not important for most municipalities. First,
30 of the 190 incumbents who ran for reelection in 2009, and would be term-limited in 2013 if they won,
were defeated. Second, the majority of the candidates from opposition parties that were able to win in
2013 also faced the long-standing incumbent in 2009. Third, of the 160 municipalities with term-limited
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mayors in 2013, about 100 had new candidates (who did not run in 2009) from the main opposition party,
and only 20 were able to defeat the candidate of the incumbent party (generally the former deputy-mayor).
Thus, for the vast majority of municipalities, there is no indication of higher quality challengers in 2013
than in 2009.
34 The results for expenditure and revenue components (not shown here) are very similar to those
reported in Table 3. Very similar results are obtained when we restrict the sample to the 160 mayors that
were term-limited in the term 2010-2013, rather than using the full sample of 611 mayors. All results not
reported in the paper are available from the authors upon request.
35 Graphs of the estimated marginal effects of Election year for the different types of mayors are
presented in Figure A.3 in the Online Appendix, and the full estimation results are reported in Table
A.6 (linear regression - 2nd stage) and Table A.7 (multinomial probit - 1st stage), also in the Online
Appendix.
36 When extending the model of equation (1) to account for the possible effects, over entire terms,
of the heterogeneous behavior of term-limited mayors, the results (available upon request) provide only
weak evidence of differences among term-limited mayors. Concretely, the municipalities of resigning
mayors have lower total revenues, which may be due to the election-year reductions reported in Table
4. Therefore, differences in behavior among term-limited mayors seem to be mainly associated with the
degree of opportunism in the election year, as shown in Tables 3 and 4.
37 These tests are available from the authors upon request.
38 The marginal effects from 2SLS and GMM estimations are reported in Table A.8 of the Online
Appendix. They are very similar to those reported in Table 4, providing evidence of the robustness of
our results.
39 The results of the fixed effects estimations, reported in Table A.9, are very similar to those of Table
4 and of the IV estimations using 2SLS or GMM (Table A.8). Sensitivity tests based on Oster (2017),
who extends the work of Altonji et al. (2005), report the value of proportional selection on unobservables
relative to observables, such that the effect of the coefficients would be zero. In general, a greater value
is associated with more robust results.
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